| The year 1995 is one of memories, and for some,
regrets and apologies as well. The victors of the Second World War
have ruled out any apology or expression of remorse for the atomic
bombings or other actions, but Japan has repeatedly been condemned for
failing to confess its war guilt fully and adequately as the
anniversary of VJ Day approaches.
The argument over the atomic bomb has a point. The bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however awful, were not acts of aggression,
but atrocities in response to aggression.
But to paint Japan as a singularly evil aggressor which refuses to
apologise for its past ignores not only the gestures which the Tokyo
government has made, but also the gestures which the West has not.
Visiting China in May, Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama
marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war by expressing
'sincere repentance for our past... including aggression and colonial
rule that caused unbearable suffering and sorrow for many people in
your country and other Asian nations'.
Not long before, Nicholas Kristof, the Tokyo correspondent of the
New York Times, reported a poll showing that the Japanese
'believe four to one that their government has not adequately
compensated the people of countries that Japan invaded or colonised'.
He also noted that, two years earlier, the Japanese Prime Minster had
offered Japan's victims an 'explicit apology for the war'.
Kristof went on to write, however, of his concern for Japan's
failure to offer an adequate apology 'for invading other Asian
countries and killing millions of people'. One of his articles was
headlined, 'Why Japan hasn't said that word', expressing our
bewilderment over Japan's unwillingness to acknowledge guilt.
The same cry was taken up in Britain by the Daily Telegraph's
defence correspondent, John Keegan. 'Why won't the Japanese say
sorry?' he asked. Presidents Kohl and Mitterrand made a joint
pilgrimage to Verdun to settle their differences; Germany acknowleged
its guilt for the Holocaust and paid some reparations to survivors;
but the Japanese, he complained, had 'wriggled out' of expressing
remorse. Keegan noted that in June the Japanese parliament passed a
motion changing 'apology' to something vaguer meaning 'reflection' or
'self-examination'.
The New York Times can be relied on to give a balanced view.
Thus, Kristof argued that: 'Japan is not the only country that has
difficulty saying it is sorry. American officials have toppled
governments over the past half-century, and Americans do not lose much
sleep over the American invasion of Canada during the War of 1812 or
the incursions into Mexico in 1914 and 1916 -- the obvious cases that
come to mind when we consider the possible reasons to "say that
word".'
Aggressors only have to apologise when they lose wars, and, even
then, there are exceptions. Some Japanese intellectuals are said to
have admitted that Germany is more remorseful than Japan over the
Second World War, but they explain that Germany's mighty neighbours
would not let the Germans forget what they had done. Weaker nations,
such as China and Korea, have not been in a position to exert such
pressure on Japan.
Few intellectuals in the United States have asked whether similar
factors might have something to do with the American talent that so
amazed Alexis de Tocqueville, the nineteenth-century French writer, as
he watched the 'triumphal march of civilisation across the desert':
namely the miraculous destruction of the natives with 'complete
respect for the laws of humanity... with singlular felicity,
tranquilly, legally, philanthropically, without shedding blood, and
without violating a single great principle of morality in the eyes of
the world'.
Or, as Theodore Roosevelt, the racist historian who became
President of the United States, put it in The Winning of the West, his
1890s' four-volume celebration of the American spirit: 'As a nation,
our Indian policy is to be blamed, because of the weakness it
displayed, because of its shortsightedness, and its occasional leaning
to the policy of sentimental humanitarians; and we have often promised
what was impossible to perform; but there has been no wilful
wrongdoing'.
According to Keegan, it is a Japanese tribal custom, 'not to admit
that the tribe itself has done wrong, either in the present or the
past. It would indeed be wrong to make such an admission; wrong for
the tribe, wrong for any individual member'.
Could 200 years of a history of crushing weaker adversaries have
something to do with the fact that the very idea of 'saying that word'
is even less comprehensible in American culture? Such questions occur
only to 'wild men in the wings', to borrow former national security
adviser McGeorge Bundy's description in 1967 of those who failed to
perceive the nobility of the US crusade in Vietnam.
The twentieth anniversary in April of the departure of US forces
from Vietnam caused much commentary, but nothing approaching Japan's
'sincere repentance for having caused unbearable suffering and sorrow'
to the Asian people. The concept is unintelligible to Americans.
The toll of Indo-Chinese dead during the US wars is impressive even
by twentieth-century standards. In the run-up to the anniversary, the
Vietnamese government released new figures on casualties, which have
been generally accepted.
Hanoi reported that 2 million civilians had been killed, the
overwhelming majority in the south, along with 1.1m North Vietnamese
and southern resistance fighters (Viet Cong, in the terminology of US
propaganda). An additional 300,000 were listed missing in action.
Washington reports 225,000 killed in the army of its client regime
('South Vietnam'); and the CIA estimates 600,000 Cambodians killed
during the US phase of what the one independent governmental inquiry
(by Finland) calls the 'Decade of Genocide' in Cambodia: 1969 to 1978.
Thousands more were killed in Laos, mainly by US attacks that were in
large part unrelated to the war in Vietnam.
The US bears responsibility for these dead, just as Japan is
responsible for deaths in China and Russia for deaths in Afghanistan.
The same applies to whoever pulled the trigger, a truism understood
very well by Western intellectuals when responsibility can be laid at
someone else's door.
It is a tribute to the US educational system that Americans
estimate Vietnamese deaths at a mere 100,000. But only 'wild men' will
ask what the reaction would be to comparable estimates of victims in
Germany or Japan, or pre-Gorbachov Russia, and what the answer tells
us about ourselves.
In Somalia recently, the US command did not count Somali
casualties. Marine Lt General Anthony Zinni, who commanded the US
troops withdrawal, informed the press: 'I'm not counting bodies... I'm
not interested'.
But, according to Charles Maynes, editor of Foreign Policy:
'CIA officials privately concede the US military may have killed from
7,000 to 10,000 Somalis,' while losing 34 US soldiers.
This was nothing to lose any sleep over, of course, hardly more
than a footnote to the record compiled from the days when the founders
were caring for 'that hapless race of native Americans, which we are
exterminating with such merciless and perfidious cruelty', as
President John Quincy Adams (1825-29) described the project long after
his own contribution to it was over. As Secretary of State in the
early nineteenth century, he was the originator of the doctrine of
unauthorized executive war that has a long history, up to Vietnam.
In Britain, there has at least been some serious soul-searching
over the bombing of Dresden by the British and US forces, destroying
the city and killing tens of thousands of civilians. Britain had been
under serious attack, something the US has not suffered since the war
of 1812.
In contrast, the fiftieth anniversary of the American fire-bombing
of Tokyo, which was so devastating that it was removed from the list
of potential atom bomb targets because further destruction would
merely pile rubble upon rubble and bodies upon bodies, was marked by
an article in the Washington Post bearing the headline: 'Japan
revising past role: more aggressor, less victim'.
As with the long list of other crimes, the reaction to the
anniversary of the firebombing was narrow: if that's what it took to
win, that's what should have been done.
In his recent memoirs In Retrospect, Robert McNamara, the
architect of America's intervention in Vietnam, relates that, by 1967,
'the stresses and tensions' were so bad that he sometimes had to take
a sleeping pill.
Fortunately, for the nation's health, there is not much else that
might cause Americans to 'lose sleep' as we commemorate events of
recent history. |